DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
Thus self-evident propositions have, we might say, a dual character. In themselves, they are those propositions which result from the immediate perception of agreement or disagreement between our ideas. They are called "self-evident truths" because they bear the evidence for their truth in themselves. If one understands them properly, one sees that they must be true, and moreover, that there is no other way to establish their truth. As Duncan emphasizes, a self-evident truth "admits not of any proof....
Reasoning is employed only about demonstrable Propositions."
Functionally, self-evident truths can serve as the axioms, or maxims, or most basic premises for a demonstration. Strictly speaking, as Duncan indicates, the two must be one, for the truly primitive propositions or axioms must have the character of selfevident or intuitive truths, that is, truths which cannot be derived from anything more fundamental than themselves. But Locke indicates there is a looser usage also, according to which certain general propositions, "most of them indeed self-evident, [but not all] were introduced into the Schools; which, being such as all men allowed and agreed in, were looked on as general measures of truth, served instead of principles . . . beyond which there was no going.. ."12 According to this looser usage, then, propositions which were not themselves strictly speaking self-evident, might serve functionally in the place of self-evidents in demonstrations. The Declaration's "self-evident truths" are at least functionally self-evident in this sense, but are they self-evident strictly speaking and in themselves? Through the years, of course, most famously by Calhoun and by various writers cited above, their self-evidence has been doubted. 3 Remarkably, the language and structure of the Declaration itself, if read attentively, supports those doubts. We must first listen to what is said: "We hold these truths to be self-evident... "Not only is the "we" who holds them emphasized, but so is the fact of holding them to be self-evident. To say "we hold these truths to be self-evident" is not the same as to say "these are selfevident truths." "We hold" insinuates a doubt as to the status of the truths; it brings to the fore the "we" in their act of "holding" the truths to be self-evident, not the truths themselves in their selfevidence. An element of subjectivity and an element of hesitation are introduced into ajudgment which should be the most epistemologically solid possible. It is almost as though the text says, "We believe or judge these truths to be self-evident." But truly "self-evident truths" have no room for "belief. There either is "immediate per-323 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS ception of agreement of ideas," that is, self-evidence, or there is not. As Robert Ginsberg well says of the "we hold":
The famous self-evident truths are not presented as self-evident truths. To do such would obviate the necessity of saying one believes in them.14 On the other hand, however, "we hold these truths to be selfevident" does not properly translate into "these are our strongly held convictions," as focusing on the "we hold" might lead us to attempt. The text states quite clearly that they are truths, not merely convictions or deep beliefs. They are truths, held to be, or as if"self-evident. The Declaration asserts as a truth that "to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the government." Governments are institutions made by men, and have no other bases for existence but their having been made and constituted by men for a specified purpose. If these claims are true, then the next assertion denominated a "self-evident truth" follows deductively from them: "whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government." The "selfevident" truths about the altering or abolishing of government follow from the truths about the institution and ends of government, and therefore cannot be properly self-evident.
Likewise the truths about the ends of government and the role of consent follow from the truths that precede them in the list. We can see that clearly enough if we discern the structural principle according to which Jefferson has organized his presentation. The series of truths presents a temporal sequence, a kind of mini-historical narrative of the political experience of the human race. It begins with the prepolitical condition before governments are "instituted among men," tells next of the institution--how and why governments come to be made-and then tells of the postinstitution phase-the corruption or falling away of government from its ends, followed by an altering or abolishing culminating in a new institution. We have then three distinct phases: civil society, precivil society, and, for want of a better term, postcivil society. We might Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own consent.21
The truths about the institution of government then follow from the truths about prepolitical society as the truths about the postpolitical situation follow from the truths about the institution of government. Therefore, neither the second nor the third set of "selfevident truths" is properly speaking self-evident.
But in the Declaration all three sets are equally held as self-evident. That suggests that the first set of truths, the truths about the prepolitical situation, are no more inherently self-evident than the others. The reading that some might be tempted to supply in the face of the above analysis-that the text means to affirm only the first or "prepolitical" truths as self-evident -is not grammatically viable. All the truths are presented in perfectly parallel clauses so it is impossible to read the text as granting some a different status from others.
That these truths were not understood as self-evident in themselves, but functionally and politically self-evident only, is suggested by a variety of other facts. Neither Jefferson nor any other thinker of his generation referred to these propositions as self-evident in any other place, so far as I know, or so far as any other scholar of the period has shown, even though the members of the revolutionary generation frequently discoursed on the very truths outlined in the Declaration. For example, the closely parallel theoretical statements in the Virginia and Massachusetts bills of rights do not designate their corresponding propositions as "self-evident truths." Nor did the "self-evident truths" formula appear in Jefferson's rough draft of the Declaration, a most striking omission if he believed the propositions to be epistemologically grounded in their self-evidence.
Rather, he said in the earlier version: "We hold these truths to be sacred and undeniable." Few matters resist definitive treatment as much as the interpretation of the significance of shifts in textual language from one draft of a text to another. Often we can hardly be certain whether a given shift intends to say better what was said 327 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS the first time, or to say something different. Nonetheless we may attempt some observations about the two versions of the Declaration. Both drafts employ the significant "we hold" locution. The first draft's "sacred and undeniable" is a good deal looser and more ambiguous than "self-evident" which has a more precise history of philosophic usage, including the important lengthy discussion of self-evidence in Locke's Essay. To call the truths "undeniable" is to make no commitment on their epistemological groundings, other than to assert strongly their truthfulness. An undeniable truth could well be a derived truth. Since, as we have shown, Jefferson understood the truths in the Declaration to be derived truths, the earlier version seems more apt than the later in this respect. On the other hand, to call the truths "sacred" is misleading in many ways. Surely they are not meant to be sacred in the sense of derivative from sacred revelation, as an eighteenth-century audience might interpret the phrase; they are presented rather as deliverances (somehow) of reason. Jefferson uses "sacred" in an attempt to find an emotionally powerful way of conveying the fundamentality to the Americans of the truths to follow.
I would suspect that Jefferson shifted away from his initial formulation in two stages. First, he decided against "sacred" probably on grounds of both meaning and rhetoric. It was potentially a very misleading term, and thus to be avoided, and in its reach for emotional charge it broke with the rhetorical placidity and dignity of the document as a whole. Having deleted "sacred," Jefferson had to do the same for "undeniable" but in the first instance perhaps, for reasons of euphony. The phrase, "to be undeniable" with which he would be left after the departure of "sacred" contains the infelicitous juxtaposition of"be" ending in a long vowel, and "undeniable" beginning with a short vowel, ajuxtaposition which requires an awkward transition for the tongue and ear between the two words, and which, most importantly, leaves the key word "undeniable," and especially its key part, "un," unaccented and thus underemphasized. The sibilant sound with which both "sacred" and self-evident" begin flows more smoothly and places the emphases of sound where the emphasis in meaning occurs.
"Self-evident truths" metJefferson's euphonic requirements as well as conveying something of what he wanted by way of indicating fundamentality, without violating the overall rhetorical tone of the text. The "we hold" introduction served partially to neutralize the blurring of meaning imported into the text through calling the truths 328 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE "self-evident" when they were not understood to be so in fact. For any readers who perceived the paradox in the use of "self-evident" in this context, there was the added advantage of Jefferson's being able to convey subtly the problem within the new political philosophy that healthy political life requires that the results of the most advanced philosophic and scientific speculation be "held" in order to be effective by a community which was not itself philosophic or scientific. While, I suspect, the expression of that paradox or problem was not the only consideration that moved Jefferson towards "selfevident," the quite elegant way in which his revised language expresses it has to be seen as one of the rhetorical triumphs of the rhetorically triumphant Declaration.
Analysis of the language, the logic, and the historic connections of the text all point to the same conclusion: the truths announced in the Declaration are not in fact self-evident, nor are they pronounced to be. They are rather to be held as if self-evident within the political community dedicated to making them effective. The truths must serve as the bedrock or first principles of all political reasoning in that regime. While they stand as the conclusion of some (unspecified) chain of philosophical or scientific reasoning, they must stand at the beginning of all chains of political reasoning. there being nothing more evident, than that Creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without Subordination or subjection, unless the Lord and Master of them all, should by any manifest Declaration of his will set one above another. 30 White concludes that the emphasized phrase in the passage means "self-evident" on the basis of the observation that for Locke, "a selfevident truth possesses the greatest amount of evidence that can be supplied for a truth."31 However that may be, it is nonetheless as certain as anything can be that the proposition Locke finds "nothing more evident than" is not self-evident.
II
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We can restate the passage more schematically to make this clear: (1) If men are creatures, that is, the product of a creating and willing God, whose will for man sets the moral standards to which human life should conform; and (2) if that God has made men all of "equal rank" etc., and not by a declaration of his will set one above another, then (3) men are of equal rank and should recognize themselves to be so. To put the point most simply: the assertion that "men should also be equal one amongst another" is the conclusion of an argument with the other propositions as its premises. But a proposition deduced from other propositions is not self-evident. Or, to restate the point in more strictly Lockean terms: "Where the agreement or disagreement [of ideas] is perceived immediately by itself, without the intervention or help of any other, there our knowledge is self-evident".32 Now the agreement of the ideas of "equality" and of "man" is not direct and immediate in this way, but rather depends on the intervention of a variety of other ideas, such as the idea of a creating God, of a divine will, of divine appointment, and so on. Moreover, Locke would not consider these premises or intervening ideas to be themselves self-evident, as can be seen from his effort to derive the idea of a creating God in book 4 of the Essay. 33 White's interpretation derives its plausibility from a simple logical error. Even if no truth may have more evidence than a selfevident truth, it does not follow that every truth than which none is more evident is self-evident. White needs, moreover, to notice Locke's distinction between self-evident propositions and self-evident truths. Locke has a great deal to say about the former, much of the point of which is to demonstrate that these are not necessarily identical to the latter. 34 Our analysis of this passage from the Second Treatise certainly coheres better with Locke's settled conviction that, in White's words, "there could be no self-evident practical principles" than does White's analysis. 35 But an argument which "rested on other premises"-or on any premises-is not self-evident, as we have already seen.
While White spends much space attempting, or seeming to attempt, to establish that the Declaration is Lockean in its appeal to self-evident truths, his real concern is not to establish that thesis at all, but rather the claim that the Declaration was "rationalist" in a sense he never explains very clearly, but which he associates with a deductive ethic in which a "natural morality" is derived from claims about the "essence of man" and natural theological knowledge or claims about God. According to White's real view, the rough draft of the Declaration better captures Jefferson's underlying thought when it calls the truths "sacred and undeniable," for while (White believes) the truths were derivative and thus clearly not self-evident, they were thought to be demonstrable and therefore "undeniable" in the sense that a theorem derived from axioms is undeniable.37 White thus makes his own point best when he says, "Jefferson would have been better off if he had let 'sacred and undeniable' stand."38 White insists then on the moral rationalism of the documents and allows the self-evidence to drop off, or rather pushes it over the cliff himself. 
According to
